The graph above shows US rates of decarbonization (explained here). It shows:
- 2018 actual = -0.01% (the US actually re-carbonized)
- Projected 2019-2029 = 2.3%
- Implied by an 50% reduction in US carbon dioxide emissions by 2030 = 8.4%
- Implied by an 80% reduction in US carbon dioxide emissions by 2050 = 6.6%
Sources= EIA and CBO and assumes 2030-2050 US real GDP growth at 1.76% (i.e., same as CBO assumes 2019-2029). If you vary GDP assumption, decarbonization will change too.
Bottom line: Any climate policy proposal should be evaluated in terms of what it does to decarbonization rates. Show your math.
We have just had a new paper accepted for publication:
McAneney, J., B. Sandercock, R. Crompton, T. Mortlock, R. Musulin, R. Pielke, Jr., and A. Gissing. (2020, in press). Normalised Insurance Losses from Australian Natural Disasters: 1966-2017, Environmental Hazards.
Here is the bottom line: When aggregated by season, there is also no significant trend in normalised losses. This is also true if only weather-related event losses are considered; in other words, after we normalise weather-related losses for changes that we know to have taken place, no residual signal remains to be explained by changes in the occurrence of extreme weather events, regardless of cause. In sum, the rising cost of natural disasters is being driven by where and how we chose to live and with more people living in vulnerable locations with more to lose, natural disasters will remain an important problem irrespective of a warming climate.
Details after the break …
Continue reading “New Paper Accepted: Normalised Insurance Losses from Australian Natural Disasters: 1966-2017”
US decarbonization rates by president, measured election year to final year of term. Data as in yesterday’s post.
- To hit -80% CO2 by 2050 requires -6.8%/year (assuming 2.0% GDP growth/year)
- Democrats have done better than Republicans
- Trump is the worst (with two years of data so far)
- None have been remotely close to rate needed for deep decarbonization
The figure above shows US rates of decarbonization 1992 to 2018. Decarbonization is a technical term that refers to a decrease in the ratio of carbon dioxide emissions to gross domestic product. The concept is derived from the Kaya Identity, which is a very powerful tool for understanding emissions and their potential to be reduced through policy action. This post provides an update on global decarbonization rates, based on new data from the EIA and OMB.
Continue reading “US Decarbonization: 1992-2018”
Decarbonization is a technical term that refers to a decrease in the ratio of carbon dioxide emissions to gross domestic product. The concept is derived from the Kaya Identity, which is a very powerful tool for understanding emissions and their potential to be reduced through policy action. This post provides an update on global decarbonization rates, based on new data from the International Energy Agency.
Continue reading “Global Decarbonization 2000-2018”
I’m moderating this great panel today at UCCS.
Along with Björn-Ola Linnér I have a new paper accepted in Minerva. To understand the picture above and its significance, you’ll have to read the paper. The misuse of science by US presidents is not a new phenomena. Details:
Pielke, Jr., R. and Björn-Ola Linnér (2019, in press). From Green Revolution to Green Evolution: A Critique of the Political Myth of Averted Famine, Minerva.
Here is the abstract:
This paper critiques the so-called “Green Revolution” as a political myth of averted famine. A “political myth,” among other functions, reflects a narrative structure that characterizes understandings of causality between policy action and outcome. As such, the details of a particular political myth elevate certain policy options (and families of policy options) over others. One important narrative strand of the political myths of the Green Revolution is a story of averted famine: in the 1950s and 1960s, scientists predicted a global crisis to emerge in the 1970s and beyond, created by a rapidly growing global population that would cause global famine as food supplies would not keep up with demand. The narrative posits that an intense period of technological innovation in agricultural productivity led to increasing crop yields which led to more food being produced, and the predicted crisis thus being averted. The fact that the world did not experience a global famine in the 1970s is cited as evidence in support of the narrative. Political myths need not necessarily be supported by evidence, but to the extent that they shape understandings of cause and effect in policymaking, political myths which are not grounded in evidence risk misleading policy makers and the public. We argue a political myth of the Green Revolution focused on averted famine is not well grounded in evidence and thus has potential to mislead to the extent it guides thinking and action related to technological innovation. We recommend an alternative narrative: The Green Evolution, in which sustain improvements in agricultural productivity did not necessarily avert a global famine, but nonetheless profoundly shaped the modern world. More broadly, we argue that one of the key functions of the practice of technology assessment is to critique and to help create the political myths that accompany technologies in society.
Please be in touch if you’d like a pre-publication copy.